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Rationality, traditionalism and the state of corporate governance mechanisms: illustrations 
from a less developed country 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this research is to provide an account of corporate governance 
practices in Bangladesh. This paper demonstrates that the traditionalist culture mediates the 
rationalist/legalist framework of corporate governance in Bangladesh.   
 
Design/methodology/approach – A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted. 
Observations and the personal working experience of one of the researchers, along with 
documentation, provided rich sources of information for the paper.  
 
Findings – The findings show that families have a dominant presence in all aspects of corporate 
governance. Boards of directors in companies play a significant part in serving the interests of 
families rather than those of general shareholders.  
 
Research limitations/implications – This study focuses on corporate governance practices in a 
traditional setting and shows how traditional culture and values are in conflict with the rational 
ideas imported from a different setting. It suggests that the World Bank’s expectations that 
Anglo-American models of corporate governance will be effective in Bangladesh and possibly 
other LDCs are unfounded. 
 
Originality/value – The paper adds to the literature on corporate governance, especially in the 
context of LDCs. It will be of great value to researchers and practitioners seeking to gain a better 
understanding of corporate governance frameworks in various settings.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, accountability, structural adjustment polices, traditionalism, 
Bangladesh 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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 Introduction 
 
This paper stems from an interest in corporate governance and economic development in less 
developed countries (LDCs). This area of research has been receiving attention since the Asian 
Debacle in 1997 (Morck et al., 2005; Singh and Zammit, 2006). Aid agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have introduced it as a key international 
development issue (World Bank, 2002). Recently, the Bangladeshi government, influenced by aid 
agencies, embarked upon open market and structural adjustment policies, including capital 
market development. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded an $80 million project to 
transform the capital markets in Bangladesh based on Anglo-American models, which included 
institutional reforms within the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), automation of the stock 
exchanges and changing capital market laws and regulations. These intended transformations 
were perceived as essential conditions for private sector development in Bangladesh. Proponents 
of the market economy regime assume that the Anglo-American corporate governance model is 
unproblematic, as is its implementation. While these issues have been debated and researched in 
Western countries, they remain largely neglected and under-researched in LDCs, especially 
Bangladesh (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). This paper seeks to fill this gap. Previous studies have 
revealed that in Bangladesh, like Anglo-American countries, some of the most powerful 
stakeholders in corporations include the boards of directors, auditors and regulators (Uddin and 
Hopper, 2003; Muzumdar, 2006). Thus, the main focus of this paper is to understand the role of 
boards of directors, shareholders, regulators and auditors in making enterprises accountable. More 
specifically, the paper poses some simple but important empirical questions: What are the roles of 
company directors? How are the interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, being 
protected? What roles do auditors play? And overall, do companies really comply with corporate 
rules and regulations? 
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 The appropriateness of the Anglo-American models and institutions for corporate governance in 
LDCs has previously been questioned (Singh, 1997, 1999; Singh and Zammit, 2006). Recent 
research has illustrated that the Anglo-American corporate governance models are to be 
questioned even in developed countries, including the USA and UK (Arnold and De Lange, 2004; 
Cullinan, 2004; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2004; Marnet, 2007). Thus, this paper questions the 
suitability of frequent bombardment with imported sets of regulations and institutional 
frameworks comprising corporate governance from a modern society, such as the USA and UK, 
to a traditional society like Bangladesh. The Anglo-American models rely on a number of 
institutional settings such as well-developed capital markets, established accounting bodies, 
democratic institutions and various autonomous bodies (Puxty et al., 1987; Robson and Cooper, 
1990; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998). Rational accounting regulations, along with the 
institutional settings, are expected to ensure the transparency and accountability of public limited 
companies. Drawing on Weberian notions of traditionalism and rationality, and previous studies 
such as those by Dyball and Valcarcel (1999) and Dyball et al. (2006), this paper demonstrates 
that traditionalist culture mediates the rationalist/legalist framework of corporate governance in 
Bangladesh. 
 
The paper is divided into several sections. A brief literature review on corporate governance 
issues is presented in the first section. The second elaborates on the Weberian notions of 
traditionalism and rationality. Contextual information about Bangladesh is then described, 
followed by the section on research methods. Corporate governance practices are presented and 
discussed applying the Weberian notions of traditionalism and rationality in the following 
section. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
Corporate governance framework – Anglo-American models 
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 Capital markets, independent accounting professions and a democratic state are seen as essential, 
but interdependent, institutions of corporate governance in the USA and UK (Chua and Poullaos, 
1993; Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Morck et al., 2005; Singh and Zammit, 2006). Researchers have 
argued that the interrelationship between the state and professions is an important element of 
corporate governance (Morck et al., 2005). Professional bodies, stock exchanges and other 
institutions in Anglo-American countries are self-regulated and relatively free from state 
interference (Greenspan, 1998). Previous research has suggested that these institutions, at the 
same time, need state backing to maintain the status quo (Willmott et al., 1992; Sikka and 
Willmott, 1995). The relative autonomy of these institutions, to some degree, has achieved 
success or at least managed to stop the wide-ranging malpractice that we see in many LDCs (Lee, 
1994). The relative efficiency of capital markets may well be an important factor in maintaining 
the autonomy of these institutions (Gaa, 1991). This relative autonomy and efficiency of capital 
markets and accounting professions means that they have placed themselves at the heart of 
corporate government framework in their actions. Previous studies have indicated that less 
developed post-colonial countries, such as Bangladesh, also have similar accounting and capital 
market structures (Mir and Rahaman, 2005). This paper sheds light on whether the institutions of 
corporate governance in Bangladesh have a similar position in implementing regulations and 
frameworks. 
 
Researchers argue that too little effort has been expended on studying corporate governance 
issues in LDCs (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999). Most of the research on accounting in LDCs has 
focused on disclosure and accounting standards, one of the key aspects of corporate governance. 
Non-compliance and non-disclosure are common findings of many studies in LDCs (Perera, 
1975; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Larson and Kenny, 1995; Mir and Rahaman, 2005; Belal and 
Owen, 2007). For example, Mir and Rahaman (2005) conclude that the perceived undemocratic 
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nature of the IAS (International Accounting Standard) adoption process in Bangladesh resulted in 
very low compliance with the standards. Some of the studies have reported that economic 
structural adjustment policies have even increased the non-compliance of listed companies in 
LDCs (Wallace, 1990; Wallace and Briston, 1993). 
 
Non-compliance, collapses and accounting scandals1 are not new in any context, let alone LDCs 
(Marnet, 2007). Collapses and scandals, predictably, led to serious debate about the fundamentals 
of corporate governance frameworks in the USA and UK (Clarke et al., 2003; Arnold and De 
Lange, 2004; Cullinan, 2004). Despite all the scandals, reforms and changes continue to put over-
reliance on external auditing and audited reports (Marnet, 2007). In general, this reliance is based 
on various assumptions, such as the autonomy of auditing companies and auditors, professional 
ethics and various other institutions, such as the stock exchange and the SEC. This paper shows 
that such understanding of the autonomy of actors and institutions is non-existent in Bangladesh, 
as in other LDCs (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999; Dyball et al., 2006). Dyball and Valcarcel (1999) 
point out that there is an underlying belief in rational/legal authority; that is, the legality of 
enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands 
(Weber, 1978). This again is based on certain norms and beliefs that underline the formal 
rationality and autonomy of individuals, institutions and regulations. This paper shows that such 
understanding of society and institutions in LDCs such as Bangladesh is misplaced.  
 
Weber’s Notion of ‘Traditionalism’ and ‘Rationality’ 
 
The paper draws on Weber’s work (1958, 1961, 1968, 1978) on the development of capitalism 
and traditional society to understand corporate governance practices by public limited companies 
in Bangladesh. Weber’s work seems relevant to understanding corporate governance practices as 
it enables us to understand why managers in limited liability companies express their loyalty to 
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small numbers of owners-managers, not to general shareholders (Uddin, 2008). Weber also 
emphasizes the importance of social, economic, cultural and historical factors in shaping a 
particular form of society (such as traditionalist), and their implications for organizational 
accountability and transparency. These issues are all important in Bangladesh. Finally, Weber’s 
framework provides a specific and heterogeneous view of the socio-historical context of 
accounting and the contingent relations of accounting to organisations and society (Colignon and 
Covaleski, 1991, p.155).  
 
Weber’s works have been especially used in the accounting literature to understand the 
development of accounting knowledge and professions and its influence upon the development of 
capitalism in capitalistic societies (Radcliff, 1997; Chua and Poullaos, 1998; Bryer, 2000; 
Caramanis, 2005; Dyball et al., 2006). None of the above studies focused on understanding 
corporate governance practices in a traditional society like Bangladesh, with the exception of that 
by Dyball and Valcarcel (1999). This paper argues that accounting researchers have made very 
limited use of the wealth of Weber’s thought in trying to understand accounting practices in both 
traditional and capitalistic societies. This paper is one of a series of papers that apply Weber’s 
notion of traditionalist domination (family/clan) in understanding accounting practices in 
traditional societies (Uddin, 2008). 
 
Referring to Weber’s work (1958, 1961), Colignon and Covaleski (1991) argue that three layers 
of analysis are required in order to understand accounting practices: the structural conditions, the 
historical context and the institutional/organisational context. To Weber, rational calculations of 
economic actions and accounting depend on the structural conditions.2 Weber’s ideal-typical 
form of capitalism/societal development provides the first layer of the framework for examining 
market conditions influencing the economic actions of the modern industrial enterprise and 
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accounting practices. Weber sees rational capitalism as only partially realised in the Western 
industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. He also recognises the traditional forms of 
capitalism that exist throughout the world even now and which were evident in Europe until the 
18th century. 
 
At the second level, Weber focuses on specific cultural and historical details to identify specific 
features of society that facilitate or obstruct the full development of rational capitalism, the 
modern enterprise and rational capital accounting. Weber recognises the role of competing ideas, 
conflicts and institutions, and how they influence capitalism, enterprises and accounting practices. 
Weber (1978) recognises these tensions in a more traditional form of society and their 
implications for organisational accountability and rationality. He argues that traditional 
domination of economic activities tends to strengthen traditional attitudes and thereby weaken the 
development of rational capitalism. This is because the property and productive capacities of 
individual economic units are primarily geared towards satisfying the ‘master’s’ (family/clans) 
needs and preferences (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999). For example, the operations of state bodies 
in Bangladesh are often politicised by political parties led by families. Employees of the state are 
more influenced by family connections than the state’s rules and regulations. Bureaucratic 
domination is continually struggling with family domination (Mannan, 2006; Uddin, 2008). 
 
Weber argues for separate organizational/institutional analyses that are nonetheless interactive, 
with external layers of analysis to understand organizational practices (Uddin, 2008). Colignon 
and Covaleski (1991), referring to Weber’s notions of rationalities, argue that multiple 
rationalities are characteristic of the modern enterprise and are the basis of conflicts that make the 
distinction between formal and substantive rationality important in their application to issues of 
accounting practices (Colignon and Covaleski, 1991, p.150). Nevertheless, rationalities take a 
different form in a traditional setting such as Bangladesh. Rational accounting practices take a 
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substantive form in order to preserve the interests of the family/clan. Dyball and Valcarcel 
(1999), referring to Weber’s work, argue that ‘traditionalist domination is commonly exercised by 
members of a ruling family(ies) or clan(s) and, unlike legal authority, is primarily based on 
personal loyalty. Obedience is to the ‘master’, not to ‘enacted rules’. The ‘master’ is expected to 
do good turns, governed by an ethical common sense of equity or of utilitarian expediency. His 
exercise of power is bound only by resistance from his ‘subjects’. It is impossible then for an 
‘impartial’ law or administrative rule to be intentionally created by legislation’ (Dyball and 
Valcarcel, 1999, p.307). Weber’s work consequently expects that accountability and transparency 
in public limited companies in a traditional society like Bangladesh would not transpire from 
imposed regulations and institutions. Owner-managers are expected to resist rational/formal 
regulations that do not serve the family’s interests. Legalistic (based on rational ideas) models 
would remain imprisoned in books and documents. The Westernised model of governance by 
policy makers for stock exchange listed companies may be perceived as a condition of the stable 
economic calculation of a ‘rational’ society (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999). However, a 
‘traditional’ society like Bangladesh is more likely to produce a very low level of rational 
calculations and give rise to a different substantive rationality for compliance, such as controls to 
serve dominant owners.  
 
Weberian notions of ‘Rational’ and ‘Traditional’ in the Bangladeshi context 
 
The development of Bangladeshi capitalism, as argued, is shaped by colonialism, exploitation, 
interventions and families (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Hopper et al., 2004), which reveals the 
traditionalist feature of capitalism. This is also reflected in the size and nature of the capital 
market of Bangladesh. The majority of the business corporations in Bangladesh are not listed on 
stock exchanges.3 Previous research has also shown that the ownership structure of the large 
stock exchange listed companies is dominated by families (BEI, 2004), not unlike other LDCs 
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(Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999). Family and kinship ties are deeply rooted in Bangladesh’s political 
and economic history. The power of family and friends often shapes the political power within 
the Bangladeshi state. Many studies have shown that weak state power is linked with strong 
family power over various institutions (Jiggings, 1976; Sobhan and Ahmed, 1980; Mannan, 
1992). These are discussed below. 
 
The independence of Bangladesh in 1971 eventually transferred the power of Pakistani families 
to Bangladeshi families (Sobhan and Ahmed, 1980). In the main, three families4 shared power in 
Bangladesh’s political history. The major two political party leaders in Bangladesh came into the 
political arena due to their inheritance5 from the deceased leaders. Previous studies have also 
argued that the core decision structure in major political parties and elected government has 
always been influenced and controlled by their kin (Mannan, 2006, 1992; Sobhan and Ahmed, 
1980). Mannan (2006) reports that major political parties in Bangladesh which vow to establish 
democracy lack inner-party democracy. When these families come to power, they devote 
themselves to eroding constitution and institutions under the facade of protecting them (Hyden, 
1983). Mannan (1992) argues that political factionalism, derived from family politics, essentially 
undermines the rule of law and institutions to maintain their loyal supporters in various positions 
within the institution. ‘This is also termed the personification of the institutions. The increasing 
influence of the tribunes6 and their family members put pressure on the existing public 
institutions of state and civil society, which has resulted in disorganisation and 
deinstitutionalisation’ (Mannan, 1992, p. 52).  
 
This has serious implications as far as corporate governance is concerned. Ruling parties 
transform the core decision-making structure of the government into a political club. This 
political club is glued by kinship and its members are protected by primordial loyalty. Tribunes 
protect corrupt kin, enabling them to accumulate wealth, and allow kin to interfere in the 
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governance of the state. Thus, political families play an instrumental role in pulverizing state 
institutions. The continuous interference renders the state dysfunctional and unaccountable to the 
people. Loyalty to families, rather than the application of professional judgments, skills and 
expertise, plays an important role in career advancement. This has in turn deeply polarized 
bureaucracy and has turned professional and autonomous bodies into partisan political 
organisations (Alvi, 1973; Uddin, 2008; Mannan, 2006). These issues will be examined more 
closely in connection with the enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms in Bangladesh 
after the research methods have been outlined in the following section. 
 
Research Methods 
 
This paper deals with research questions that are very sensitive to many. Secrecy is a major 
stumbling block as far as the validation of evidence goes in traditional settings (Dyball and 
Valcarcel, 1999; Uddin and Hopper, 2001). We used interviews, documentary evidence and 
participant observations. The triangulation approach enabled the authors to understand the events 
and address the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions set out earlier (Yin, 2003). In two stages, we 
interviewed 26 people. Our main set of interviewees consisted of accounting practitioners, 
officials from stock exchanges, the SEC and aid agencies, general shareholders, managers from 
investment companies, accountants and executives from various listed companies, and members 
of boards of directors. Interviewees were given full anonymity. The interviews lasted 30 minutes 
to 2 hours, with notes taken throughout. Interview questions were semi-structured. The range of 
issues raised during the interviews covered four major areas: accounting reports and their 
manipulation, shareholders’ interests, the role of directors and the role of auditors.  
 
The documentation examined consisted mainly of accounting reports, institutions’ websites, legal 
documents and official notifications from stock exchange officials and the SEC. Newspaper 
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reports also played a part in our investigation. Participant observation consisted primarily of the 
personal observations7 of the second author. While we recognize that this is associated with the 
problem of validation (Silverman, 1985), we nevertheless believe that this provides unique 
insights into why and how certain forms of non-compliance with accounting regulations occur in 
established companies. This enabled us to form our questions while interviewing other 
accountants, auditors and SEC officials. Documentary evidence and interviews corroborate and 
complement the personal experience of the second author. The first author also attended two 
AGMs during the field trip to complement the second author’s working experience as an 
accountant in various companies.  
 
A follow-up visit in 2007 was organised to allow the first author to visit the field again and to 
arrange interviews, especially with some shareholders, academics and aid agency officials. Field 
notes were revisited and recent documents, including new SEC announcements and newspaper 
reports, were collected during the visit. In particular, we organised seminars and discussion 
forums with practising professional members and aid agencies in Bangladesh to understand their 
views regarding corporate governance practices in Bangladesh. Presentation of our evidence to 
various communities (academic and professional, in multiple settings) has eliminated 
misinterpretations, enhanced internal and external validity and improved our explanations 
(Patton, 2002). We have made attempts to enhance internal and external validity by discussing 
contradictory evidence8 (if any) with our respondents, the academic community and policy 
makers (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Interviews, comments from discussion forums, evidence 
from newspaper reports, observations and documents were summarised under the four major 
areas mentioned earlier. Theoretical concepts were explained and iterated alongside the empirical 
evidence to gain a wider understanding of corporate governance issues in Bangladesh. 
 
The ‘Rational’ and ‘Traditional’ in corporate governance practices in Bangladesh 
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 In Bangladesh, corporate governance regulations9 currently stem mainly from four established 
institutions: the accounting profession, the SEC, stock exchanges and the RJSC (Registrar of 
Joint Stock Companies – a government office). These institutions enforce various regulations and 
standards, such as the International Accounting Standards and International Auditing Standards 
adopted by the ICAB (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh), the Companies Act 
1994, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and stock exchange listing requirements (Mir 
and Rahaman, 2005). 
 
[Insert Figure One near here] 
 
In the past, accounting reports were mainly drafted and audited along the lines of regulations set 
out in two sets of regulations: the Companies Act 1913 and the stock exchange listing 
requirements. This was changed in 1993. Being advised and funded by the donor agencies, the 
SEC, as an autonomous body, was established in order to strengthen the capital market. Soon 
after, the Companies Act 1913 was replaced by a new Act in 1994. The listed companies must 
comply with the rules of the SEC10 to be listed on the stock exchanges11 and thereby they fulfil 
the listing requirements in addition to the requirements of the Companies Act 1994.  
 
Overall, the SEC has been given the responsibility for regulating the capital market. The SEC has 
the power to contact companies to obtain more information, to request explanations of accounting 
items and for other reasons, such as an abnormal share price etc. The SEC, in case of any default, 
has the power to impose penalties. The SEC also oversees the operating affairs of the stock 
exchanges in Bangladesh. For example, the stock exchanges are required to consult the SEC 
before the appointment or removal of their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). The SEC also keeps 
a close eye on the daily affairs of the stock exchanges12.  
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Besides the above regulatory actors, the government, via the Ministry of Finance, continues to 
influence the capital markets, often at the behest of aid agencies and indeed international 
financiers.13 The ministry/government is the appointing authority for the top officials of the 
SEC.14 The corporate governance structure presented above is not far from that in Anglo-
American countries in an idealist form, albeit with some forms of government intervention (Singh 
and Zammit, 2006). The following sub-sections are set out in the form of research questions to 
provide a detailed account of the intended and actual practices of corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
 
Board of Directors  
 
The board of directors has been recognized as a major corporate governance mechanism in 
Anglo-American corporate governance models. This is also similar to Bangladeshi companies, at 
least in legal terms. The board has the responsibility of leading an organisation, with effective 
decision-making and proper monitoring on behalf of the principals of the firm (Reaz and Arun, 
2006). By law, the board of directors is also accountable to the shareholders for the overall affairs 
of the business (Companies Act, 1994, Schedule 1 Section 104). According to Section 90(1) of 
the Companies Act 1994, every public limited company, and every private company that is a 
subsidiary of a public limited company, must have at least three directors representing the 
shareholders.15 Directors are elected by the shareholders at the annual general meeting (AGM) 
(Companies Act, 1994, Section 91) and they can also be removed by the shareholders under 
Section 106. Nevertheless, in reality, the membership of boards and overall accountability of the 
boards to general shareholders are completely dominated by family dynamics, as expected from a 
traditional society (Weber, 1978). These issues are discussed below. 
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The fieldwork revealed that the election and re-election of directors is an event at AGMs that is 
carefully arranged by the sponsor directors, so that their chosen individuals can be elected and re-
elected time and time again. Reaz and Arun (2006) observed the same pattern in banking 
companies in Bangladesh. This observation is also consistent with the survey conducted by the 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) in 2004 (BEI, 2004). More interestingly, but not 
surprisingly, the boards of directors in most of the listed companies in Bangladesh comprise very 
close family members. One SEC official commented in a newspaper article, ‘these companies are 
closely held companies meaning board of directors consists of husband, wife, son(s), daughter(s) 
or members of the family’ (The Guardian, 2004, p.3). The BEI survey indicates that the boards for 
73% of the non-banking companies listed on the DSE are dominated by close family members. 
Muzumdar (2006) comments that most of the listed companies, except multinationals, are 
dominated by family members, as the head of the family becomes the chairman and other family 
members occupy the important posts such as CEO or managing director. One such company is 
PC (reported in Uddin and Hopper, 2001). The chairman was the father and the elder brother 
became the managing director. The other two brothers became the executive director and 
marketing director; they also became members of the board of directors. According to Weber 
(1978), it is very common for the most important posts to be filled by members of the ruling 
family or clan in traditionalistic organizations. Close family members on the board ensure that 
family ‘secrets’ remain safe. This is a ‘rational’ action as far as the family is concerned. The 
selection of close family members also enables family domination within the enterprise to 
continue (Uddin, 2008). 
 
Non-family members, on occasions, have been elected to the boards, often due to loan 
conditionalities from the banks or equity participation. However, as respondents claim, the 
majority of these external directors (non-family members) have hardly any involvement in the 
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true affairs of the companies they are elected to serve. The second author’s experience indicates 
some of these nominated directors only play the role of attending stipulated board meetings. One 
experienced general manager opined ‘The family manages all of the affairs. In cases where there 
are directors other than the family members, they are mostly there because of their technical or 
specialized knowledge of the business. They effectively play an advisory role. In fact, external 
directors have no strong role in the board’. It is important to note that there is no mandatory 
provision regarding what percentages of the directors should be executive and non-executive. 
One manager from an investment company revealed ‘In most of the local companies, independent 
directors are being appointed by name only. They are choosing persons who are either a friend 
or someone who will always act as per the directive of the sponsors. They are independent in 
name only’. These are examples where traditionalism encounters and mediates the rational 
enterprise. The corporate governance laws, imported from the Anglo-American models, generate 
unintended consequences for Bangladeshi companies, as previous researchers predicted (Morck 
et al., 2005; Mueller, 2006; Singh and Zammit, 2006). We would like to argue, in keeping with 
the findings of Dyball et al. (2006) in the Philippines, that incompatible modes of action 
(traditional and modern) are at play here.  
 
Holding regular board meetings is another contentious issue in relation to the operations of boards 
of directors in Bangladeshi companies. The law provides that directors must hold board meetings 
at least four times a year and once every three months. Decisions including the approval of annual 
accounts, recommendation of dividends, etc., require a resolution by the majority of the directors 
at their board meetings. However, it is commonly understood among employees of public limited 
companies that the board meeting culture is merely a formality. Interviews with many 
respondents revealed that the board of directors has hardly ever sat in at formal meetings. 
Decisions are taken and implemented by the executives without any reference to the board, but by 
consulting the sponsor directors or head of the family. One non-executive director commented 
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‘The board has no real existence at all. What agenda is to be discussed in the board? This is only 
on paper. The sponsor himself is managing the whole affair. There is no one to ask questions. The 
board is dominated by the close family members’. An interview with an executive director 
revealed ‘I have heard of no publicly listed company having a board meeting unless there are 
representatives from the institutional equity partners. Ironically, a resolution of the board is 
considered to be the most important document. You even need a board resolution to open up a 
bank account. Everybody knows it is fake’. One academic opined ‘most businesses in Bangladesh 
are in the formative stage of the life cycle characterised by the reluctance of the owners to share 
power… as a result, both policy and executive decisions are in the hands of sponsor directors’. 
This view is also held by one chartered accountant who shared his experience with the researcher: 
‘I was accompanying one managing director and one of the sponsors of a listed insurance 
company who was coming out of a seminar on corporate governance! He got a phone call from 
his finance director who sought his permission to sign a cheque for a mere Tk16. 5,000’.This, 
according to the accountant, is not uncommon in most of the listed companies in Bangladesh. 
This supports our view that traditional modes of operation are dominant in Bangladeshi 
companies. Rational governance measures such as ‘holding regular board meetings’ or ‘writing 
the minutes of meetings’, in our judgement, have little impact on the traditional way of doing 
things. 
 
[Insert Table One near here] 
 
Table One shows the ownership patterns of the top twenty companies (in terms of paid-up 
capital) in Bangladesh. Sponsors (who are often close family members) may hold less than 50% 
of the shares, but still manage to establish their influence on the company using friends and 
relatives listed in the general shareholders’ group (see also Uddin, 2008). The influence of 
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institutional investors is almost absent in the public limited companies of Bangladesh, as the 
second author’s experience indicates and as confirmed by other respondents. One general 
manager of a publicly listed financial institution (involved in merchant banking) commented, 
‘These institutional shareholders are mostly secondary market traders. They are not equity 
partners in a true sense’. He further commented ‘To become a director, as an institutional 
shareholder you need the support of the sponsors. Without their support, you cannot be a director 
because your institution does not have enough shares to override the sponsors’. Referring to his 
bank, the respondent stated that the ‘institution tried to become a director of a bank. For this they 
purchased 5% of the shares of that bank. But due to opposition from the sponsors, they could not 
succeed’. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argue that institutional investors are likely to exert less 
influence for a variety of reasons, such as getting a fraction of the benefits from improved 
investor protection and the possibility of receiving side payments from controlling insiders. In the 
case of Bangladesh, institutional investors often do not have a sufficient stake in the company, 
unlike institutional investors in the UK, to exert any pressure or override the sponsors. Also, there 
are no major institutional investors except one - Investment Company Bangladesh (ICB).17 
Substantial proportions of the shares of listed companies are held by dispersed individuals who 
are unable to influence the management of the companies. Thus, the companies are virtually 
controlled, managed and operated by families (even though in many cases they own a minority of 
the shares), and more specifically by one or two active sponsor directors.  
 
According to Weber (1978), family or clans take precedence over the legal authority. Often, there 
is no separation between the enterprise and the household, and it is frequently difficult to discern 
larger ‘segments of capital’ divided along coherent sectoral lines (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999, 
p.306). Due to the strong presence of close family members on the board, board meetings turn 
into family meetings. Family meetings are not held publicly and information about their outcome 
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is not disclosed, as the business is seen as a household matter and therefore confidential. This is 
also similar in other LDCs (Ansari and Bell, 1991; Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999).  
 
Shareholders 
 
During the last decade, public limited companies in Bangladesh have seen a wide range of 
regulations formulated simply to protect general shareholders’ interests. The main aspects of 
these regulations are to make the management of companies (often owner-managers) accountable 
to general shareholders by holding annual general meetings on a regular basis and declaring 
dividends frequently in the context of weak capital markets (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). These 
issues are discussed below.  
 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
 
Holding an AGM is a mandatory requirement for publicly traded companies in Bangladesh. The 
Companies Act 1994 (Section 82) states that if a default is made in holding the AGM, the 
directors of the company shall be punishable with a fine, which may extend to Tk. 10,000, and in 
case of continuing default, a further fine, which may extend to Tk. 250 per day for each day of 
default. Companies can also be degraded to ‘Z’ category18 for not holding AGMs. Another 
punitive measure is de-listing a company from the stock exchange if it does not hold an AGM for 
three consecutive years. These measures, on the face of it, seem very punitive. Now, the question 
is: are these measures working? 
 
The fieldwork indicates default or delay in holding an AGM is not very unusual among listed 
companies in Bangladesh. The DSE revealed that 30 out of 237 companies failed to hold their 
AGMs in 2004, while 41 out of 248 failed to hold the same in 2003. Some companies even closed 
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their operations. Recently, there have been several cases of fines being imposed on directors for 
not holding an AGM. The SEC identified 36 companies to be liquidated for not holding AGMs 
for a long time (in some cases 10 consecutive years) but only 13 of them eventually de-listed 
from the DSE (Jugantor, 2007). One official of the DSE commented ‘If we de-list the company, 
small investors will suffer. So we charge penalties to the companies’. The fieldwork further 
revealed that companies do not bother paying penalties. One official further commented ‘Filing 
cases against the companies is also not a good idea because it may take a long time and the DSE 
are not prepared to bear these expenses’. Uddin and Hopper (2001) report that a case was filed in 
the High Court against a company for not holding AGMs. Our fieldwork revealed that this 
company is still listed on the DSE. Several newspaper reports indicate that the family owning the 
company had managed to establish close links with the son of the then prime minister in 2001 
(The Daily Star, 14 March, 2007). The suspicion, shared by many respondents, is that court cases 
against this company were withheld by the then government because of the family connections. 
Hence, the traditional mode of operation is in action, with personal relationships influencing 
corporate governance mechanisms. This is similar to the findings of Dyball et al. (2006), who 
comment that ‘power’ and ‘influence’ were important elements in the bank’s decisions to grant or 
deny loans. This would allude to a ‘traditional’ mode of operations, where ‘personal’ 
relationships constitute market and state transactions (p.62). We would argue that the family has 
taken advantage of the poor justice system (lack of state resources) and relied on family resources 
(traditional norms) to inhibit accountability to other stakeholders.  
 
However, the authors argue that holding AGMs still does not guarantee accountability and 
transparency to general shareholders. One non-executive director concluded ‘the whole AGM 
output is zero. It takes 5-10 minutes to complete the AGM. I do not even have time to read out a 
proposal’. In brief, AGMs are short, chaotic and have lost credibility among general 
shareholders. AGMs are often stage-managed as many respondents, including SEC officials, have 
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claimed. One accountant commented ‘over the years, there has developed a small group of 
people who create chaos and disrupt the meetings deliberately’. As respondents have claimed, 
company management, led by sponsor directors, come to an a priori understanding with these 
‘AGM Mastans’19 (the Bengali word Mastan means criminal). These people, in return for a 
handsome toll, totally dominate the AGM proceedings. One interviewee reported ‘The usual 
procedure is that one or two of the pre-selected Mastans would dramatically and vehemently 
protest or criticize some issues insignificant to the company affairs while the majority of them 
would praise the “excellent management” of the company and would support every AGM agenda 
in favour of the company management’. While a vote for passing the AGM agenda is sought by 
the chairman of the meeting, all of them would make a hue and cry together and pass the agenda 
even before it was read out. One non-executive director even confirmed that they hire people in 
their favour and pay money to the AGM Mastans. One finance director (himself a shareholder of 
many companies) claimed ‘the same group of people is hired by the companies and everybody 
knows that’. One auditor further confirmed ‘The AGM is stage-managed. There are 40-50 
common people who attend all the AGMs and it is not very costly at all to manage them’. One 
portfolio manager commented ‘From attending different AGMs, I would say only 5-10% of the 
local companies don’t stage-manage the AGM’.  In many cases, general shareholders are rather 
afraid of raising any issue20 at the AGM for fear of assault by these ‘Mastans’ (Khan, 2004). One 
SEC official commented in a newspaper article: ‘On many occasions general investors are not 
allowed to participate in the discussion on the agenda of the meeting, sometimes by the 
muscleman hired by the delinquent entrepreneurs... who want to have pecuniary benefits from the 
management’ (The Guardian, 2004). This is similar to Cooke and Sawa’s (1998) findings on 
Japanese corporate governance. They found that one group, called ‘Sokaiya’, disrupt meetings 
and often claim money from the company management. It is not rare to find that companies hold 
AGMs without any opposition from shareholders, even if they do not pay dividends for a number 
of years or close down their business activities, diverting the funds to other businesses after 
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raising money from the general public. However, this paper does not wish to argue that all 
company management applies illegal tactics to avoid embarrassment at AGMs, but there are 
many instances where companies go as far as hiring people (AGM Mastans) in order to render 
modern corporate governance measures ineffective. Hence, traditionalism mediates rational 
processes – the operation of AGMs, to ensure accountability.  
 
Furthermore, companies apply a number of tactics including discouraging shareholders attending 
the AGM. One director commented, ‘We shifted the meeting venue to factory premises a long 
way from the capital city. People are generally less inclined to go to a distant venue just to attend 
the AGM’. The authors also found poor attendance at AGMs on many occasions. In one case, 
only around 300 out of 4,000 shareholders attended the AGM. At most AGMs, discussions are 
often diverted to petty issues (Khan, 2004). One non-executive director commented 
‘Questions/comments raised in the AGM are mostly silly in nature - like the quality of the food, 
arrangements of toilets, a shareholder not properly treated by an employee etc. I have not faced a 
single quality question in 2-3 years in the AGM. Those who talk at the AGM do so with some 
motive. While this motive may be as petty as being photographed, appearing to be someone 
having influence or managing to get some extra food, this can also be a trick to compel 
management to pay a toll’ (illicit payment). This is similar to the experience of the authors during 
AGMs.21 In the case of a leading company’s AGM, out of around 35,000 plus shareholders, 
fewer than 200 people, including the so-called Mastans, entered the meeting venue and joined the 
proceedings, although the registered number of attendees in person and by proxy was 
approximately 12,000 plus. It seems the rest of them came to the AGM venue only to collect the 
expensive and delicious lunch pack offered by the company. Very often participants were more 
interested in collecting the gift pack than in listening to the AGM proceedings, as confirmed by 
SEC officials. This experience was shared by almost all respondents. The SEC has subsequently 
banned the distribution of any gifts to shareholders at AGMs. Companies now provide delicious 
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foods or refreshment packs, which are not legally restricted. Recently, one company offered cash 
to participating shareholders, as the interviewees have confirmed. 
 
In order to bring about some discipline at AGMs, the SEC introduced a mandatory rule that listed 
companies must make video recordings of their AGM proceedings and required the companies to 
submit the unedited versions of the videotapes to the SEC. This rule has, however, been 
challenged by one company in the courts and remains to be seen in action. The SEC also 
introduced a provision to nominate one of its officers at the AGM to observe and report the 
proceedings to the SEC. However, this provision has not been able to make a dent in the chaotic 
nature of AGMs, as our fieldwork revealed. Furthermore, according to the law, companies are 
required to submit the minutes of their AGM to the SEC, and also to the Registrar of Joint Stock 
Companies (RJSC). Nevertheless, there are allegations by the respondents that companies often 
fabricate minutes of these meetings to their advantage. The report from the SEC officials and 
minutes of AGMs submitted by the company often deviate, one SEC official reported. No actions 
have so far been taken against any companies for these deviations. This shows that companies 
continue to ignore, bypass and resist rational measures imposed on them. Two modes of action 
(traditional and rational) are in a continuous struggle with each other. We would argue that the 
rational measures to make directors/families accountable to general or minority shareholders 
remain ineffective. Traditional attitudes mediate the rational process and consequently hinder the 
rational development of accountability.  
 
Dividend 
 
Dividend policy is another aspect of Bangladeshi companies where malpractice reaches its peak. 
General shareholders have a strong preference for dividends in Bangladesh (Khan, 2004). A 
series of measures/regulations22 have been announced by the SEC and the government especially 
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to provide tax incentives to dividend-declaring companies. Several punitive measures for non-
payment of dividends have also been introduced (Finance Act, 2004). According to Stock 
Exchange Regulations (Section 31-1), companies should be delisted if they do not declare 
dividends for five consecutive years. None of the measures seem to have had any impact on the 
dividend-declaring behaviour of Bangladeshi companies. Muzumdar’s (2006) work showed that 
only 46% of the total companies, including multinational and banking companies, listed on the 
DSE declared dividends in 2005. This ratio would be even worse if multinational and banking 
companies were excluded from the list, as they have better dividend-declaring tendencies than the 
others (Imam, 2006). One newspaper report suggested that 19 companies had not paid any 
dividends since their inception, and 48 out of 248 listed companies on the DSE had not paid a 
dividend for the last 5 years (Financial Express, 10 August 2004). Owner-managers sometimes go 
to great lengths to avoid the measures for a dividend, including political influence and taking 
advantage of the slow judicial system. One SEC official cited an example: ‘one company 
sponsored by an influential political leader of the country, was about to face a “special audit” 
order from the SEC, as it had not paid a dividend to its shareholders for years. To avoid the 
special audit by the SEC-nominated firm, the owner-managers, using their political connections, 
negotiated with the SEC with a commitment to pay dividend to the shareholders at the next AGM. 
Accordingly, the company passed a resolution that a 10% dividend should be paid to the general 
shareholders but not to the sponsor directors. Subsequently, one of the sponsor directors filed a 
lawsuit against this decision, thus delaying the dividend payment’. SEC officials believed that 
this was done intentionally and in collaboration with the other directors. 
 
Interviews with shareholders revealed that a dividend is often declared, but it takes a long time 
(even 2-3 years in some cases) to pay the declared dividend. For example, one company declared 
large dividends and bonus shares to push the share price up in 1996. After the shares market 
crashed in the same year, the company did not bother to pay any dividends or bonus shares, 
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prompting the SEC to file a case against it. The dividend was finally paid to shareholders in 2005.  
This report also linked the same company with the then prime minister’s son (The Daily Star, 14 
March 2007). One SEC official reported in a newspaper article: ‘on quite a few occasions, 
dividend was not paid even after approval of the same at AGM’ (The Guardian, 2004). The 
situation is so bad, the respondents claimed, that shareholders often believe that payment of a 
dividend is a generosity on the part of the sponsors. One non-executive director reported: ‘my 
company was listed in 1996 and it was oversubscribed. Initially, the sponsors had the idea that it 
is mandatory to pay dividend. So in the very first year they declared 12% dividend after only 
three months of commercial operation. In the second year they also declared a dividend. He said 
that last year they declared a dividend. But when the time for disbursement of dividend payment 
came, the sponsor, who is basically managing the business, starts dilly-dallying. They say “we 
should not deprive our shareholders” but when the issue of disbursement comes they are 
unwilling’. This is a common practice in many companies as confirmed by respondents.  
 
There are several examples that show how dividends are often used by sponsor directors for their 
personal gains. One stock exchange official commented ‘there are companies which have raised 
funds from the public, showing lucrative project proposals and attractive dividend plans in the 
prospectus, but there are many cases where the company has either shut down its operations 
within 2-3 years after raising funds or continues to show losses year after year’. Some of these 
companies have diverted their funds to other companies and are in full operation in the market 
under a different name, as the interview with an ex-SEC official revealed. For example, one shoe 
manufacturing company came to public offering in 1996 with a 100% premium. Since then, the 
company has never paid a dividend to its shareholders and its Tk. 100 (face value) ordinary 
shares were sold as low as Tk. 523 (DSE, 2006). Many of these companies remain untouched. A 
lack of resources at the disposal of the SEC is a common complaint from officials. Family 
connections are often argued as the principal reasons for companies not being investigated by the 
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SEC. For example, Uddin and Hopper (2003) report such a company where there was even the 
failure to audit the company accounts, let alone declare dividends. Newspaper reports often 
indicate the relationship between the sponsor directors of this company and the prime minister of 
the previous government of Bangladesh (The Daily Star, 12 June 2007). Actors (in this case 
family) draw their power from the political parties (led by a handful of families) and manage to 
stop the rational measures often introduced by state bodies such as the SEC in Bangladesh. Actors 
within the company are not always necessarily related to families leading the political parties, but 
manage to exploit the familial relationship of the political parties. Mannan (1992) argues that 
political parties maintain their loyal supporters in various positions within the institution and 
thereby personalise the state bodies. The personifications of state bodies enable the family actors 
at the company level frequently to dodge the rational measures intended for them. This is not 
unexpected from a traditional society, according to Weber (1978). Traditional processes draw 
power from families that have more resources than the state or state-like bodies in Bangladesh. 
Again, this is likely to be similar in other traditional societies. 
 
Financial Reporting and Auditing 
 
There are three main sources that affect the preparation, presentation and disclosure of the 
financial statements of listed companies, namely the Companies Act 1994, SEC Rules and 
Guidelines, and International Accounting and Auditing Standards, as adopted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, Bangladesh (ICAB). While the financial disclosure requirements and 
auditing standards set out by the SEC for listed companies are quite comprehensive, actual 
compliance is highly questionable. One experienced chartered accountant commented ‘the 
sponsors [owner-managers] are not interested in transparent reports. What they report in the 
annual report is not what they have really done. That’s why they want to manage accounting 
reports’. It is not unusual to find, as many respondents confirmed, the family members (hence the 
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directors) instructing their accountants to prepare favourable reports to important stakeholders 
such as creditors, the SEC and stock exchange officials. In addition to the annual accounts, the 
SEC regulations require publicly traded companies to publish their half-yearly accounts, namely 
balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and cash flow statements, within one month of the date 
of close of the half year in the form prescribed by the commission. No company has ever 
complied with the requirement fully, as an SEC official confirmed. Furthermore, there are 
examples where companies have not even audited annual accounts but are still stock exchange 
listed (Uddin and Hopper, 2001, 2003).24 Although there are so many compliance requirements, 
the SEC itself hardly has the requisite personnel, technical or logistical support to monitor them 
(Khan, 2004). One SEC official revealed that there are only three personnel to oversee 
compliance issues for over 200 listed companies. One non-executive director even claimed ‘the 
capability of the SEC officials is questionable. I find hardly anybody in the SEC capable of 
monitoring’. The situation of the other regulatory body - the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies 
(RJSC), which is actually the controlling authority of approximately 2,500 companies (both listed 
and non-listed) in the country, is rather worse. It has virtually become a place for dumping 
papers, with no-one to look after regulatory compliance, as the respondents claimed. The lack of 
resources in the state agencies confirms our previous belief regarding the nature of traditionalism 
(Weber, 1978). This also provides us with an explanation of why rational measures, such as 
international accounting and auditing standards, have little or no influence on improving levels of 
disclosure and compliance in Bangladeshi companies (Mir and Rahaman, 2005; Belal and Owen, 
2007). 
 
The auditors, as per Section 213 of the Companies Act 1994, are required to give their opinion as 
to whether the accounts give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and its 
operating results for the financial year. The declaration that the auditor has to make is very 
similar to what has been practised in the USA and UK. In the context of weak capital markets, the 
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SEC has made additional rules and guidelines mandatory for companies. These rules closely 
follow the Anglo-American format being advised by the aid agencies (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; 
Singh and Zammit, 2006). The auditors are also required to testify whether the companies 
conform to the SEC’s rules and guidelines. Thus, the role of an independent auditor is vital in 
ensuring transparency. This notion of an ‘independent’ auditor is based on the assumption, 
developed in modern states, that an audit is a product of rational calculation. To what extent is 
this rationality appropriate in a traditional setting? As Weber (1978) points out, traditionalism 
mediates the process of rational behaviour, so the question remains as to whether auditors can 
maintain independence in Western terms. In the words of Dyball and Valcarcel (1999), ‘…should 
the Philippine accountant continue to present himself as impartial, independent and competent, 
that is, as a “professional” in “Western” terms?’ (p.319).  
 
The supposed independence of auditors does not bear semblance to the strong belief held by 
many stakeholders, as the respondents claimed, that there exists an evil nexus between the 
auditors and owners-managers in Bangladeshi companies. One finance manager commented 
‘Believe it or not, even the tax inspectors, while assessing the tax, do not accept audited 
statements as a trustworthy source of information. The Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Bangladesh - the regulatory body of the stock exchanges - also seems to be reluctant to accept the 
audited statements of the listed companies without question’. Interviews with other finance 
directors revealed the same story. One director shared his experience and revealed ‘Even reputed 
auditors have signed whatever we have produced. I think they did not even have the capability to 
understand the tricks’. He said ‘in the annual report we write nice words about corporate 
governance but none of them are put into practice’. According to him, ‘Owners dictate the 
accounts’. Regarding auditors being compromised, he said ‘who can afford to lose his bread and 
butter’? This view is also shared by one experienced auditor: ‘Auditor fees are very poor. After 
auditing publicly listed companies, I would get only Tk. 100,000 – 150,000, but I have to take on 
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a lot of responsibility, have to face a lot of risks. Why should I do that’? On the same issue, one 
ex-SEC official commented ‘I have examined many annual reports. They are badly prepared, but 
still receive certificates from the auditors.  You can see this just by looking at the audit fee 
figures. It is impossible to audit these companies with the audit fees mentioned’. Previous 
research has also revealed that the integrity and competence of the professional audit firms is 
questionable and consequently the financial reporting practices in Bangladesh lack quality 
(meaning the adequacy of disclosure), as well as transparency of information disclosed (Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994). Reaz and Arun’s (2006) work on audits in Bangladeshi Banks reveals that 
banks are very lucrative clients and, in most cases, the audit firms are also linked with the 
personal businesses of the bank owners. As a result, the auditors tend to give in to the demands of 
the banks’ owners and prepare audit reports in the way the banks want them to (p.101). One 
World Bank-commissioned report concluded that representatives of the investment community 
generally agree that audited financial statements are rarely reliable and free from material 
misstatement (World Bank, 2003). It is perhaps the lack of trust in the audited financial 
statements that has compelled the SEC to introduce a rule for the special auditing of listed 
companies by the SEC’s appointed auditors. Special audits have been carried out in a number of 
companies; however, no action can be taken based on these audits.  
 
Recently, the SEC introduced a rule requiring companies to change their auditors after three years 
of consecutive audit, as opposed to the provisions of the Companies Act 1994 that rather imposed 
restrictions on the removal of auditors to maintain independence. This rule has been challenged in 
court by some companies and is now pending. Regulatory efforts often struggle because business 
elites, using their political connections25 and resources, always seem able to block various 
measures taken by institutions such as the SEC (The Daily Star, 1 September 2006; Prothom Alo, 
2007). This further shows tensions between traditionalism and expectations from modern 
enterprises. We argue that it is not surprising that family-controlled companies inhibit 
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accountability and transparency, because this is about revealing family secrets. Dyball and 
Valcarcel (1999) argue that auditing is viewed as an outsider peeking in rather than rational 
action. A family business is more like a household, where disclosure is seen as revealing the 
family’s secrets. Compliance with disclosure rules is not internalised but is seen as a burden. 
Disclosure within the family has more value than disclosure for legal reasons (p.308). 
Researchers argue that the unwillingness to reveal financial information may well be due to a tax-
avoidance culture (Perera, 1975) brought about by weak regulatory frameworks and enforcement. 
We argue that traditionalism is at work here to weaken this regulatory framework. Families draw 
their power from sources other than state agencies or legal institutions. State bodies are often 
hostage to family-led political parties. Recently, various newspaper reports and court cases have 
implicated the two former prime ministers and their families in the personification of state 
institutions, including the election commission and the public service commission, forming links 
with business families for funds and even embezzlement of state funds (The Daily Star, 14 
March, 12 June, 2007; The Financial Express, 2007).26  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper concludes by considering the research aims in the introductory sections. First, the paper 
sought to present an account of corporate governance mechanisms and practices in Bangladesh. 
More specifically, it poses some simple but important empirical questions: What are the roles of 
company directors? How are the interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, being 
protected? What roles do auditors play? Do companies, overall, comply with corporate rules and 
regulations? Second, drawing on previous studies such as those of Weber (1978), Dyball and 
Valcarcel (1999) and Dyball et al. (2006), this paper sought to demonstrate that the traditionalist 
culture mediates the rationalist/legalist framework of corporate governance in Bangladesh. 
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Finally, the paper further contributes to the more fundamental debate about the effectiveness of 
structural adjustment programmes, including capital market reforms, in LDCs.  
 
Companies are entirely controlled, managed and operated by the sponsor directors/family 
members, even though in many cases they own a minority of the shares. Directors bend/break the 
rules to serve the family. The accountability of companies to general shareholders is minimal. 
The paper has also highlighted the state of AGMs and dividend-declaring tendencies. Company 
accounts are not audited properly. Financial accounts are often misleading. This paper, in line 
with previous research, concludes that the integrity and competence of the professional audit 
firms is questionable and, consequently, the financial reporting practices in Bangladesh lack 
quality (meaning the adequacy of disclosure) as well as transparency of information disclosed. 
Key corporate governance measures, highlighted in this study, are being ignored by many 
companies and rules essentially remain ineffective. To sum up, companies fail to comply with 
basic corporate rules and regulations, even auditing their own accounts. These findings are 
similar to those from previous studies (Uddin and Hopper, 2001, 2003; Mir and Rahaman, 2005). 
 
We argue, drawing on Weber’s notions of traditionalism, empirical illustrations, and political and 
economic history, that the traditionalist culture mediates the process of rationality of regulatory 
frameworks. The substantial body of evidence drawn from interviews, media coverage and other 
scholarly research collected, analysed and synthesised by the authors supports the theoretical 
standpoint. This also gives us a wider understanding of non-compliance problems in Bangladeshi 
companies. The enacted rules and regulations for accountability are based on assumptions that 
rationality is at work in Bangladesh. Our findings indicate that the families and their kin effectively 
subvert the rational measures. We found that familial and political connections are often in direct 
contradiction with the state’s rational and legal power. The families eventually weaken the state’s 
power in the enforcement of rules and regulations. Thus, the family tradition in business and 
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politics continues to thrive, despite continuous bombardment with strict measures and reforms. 
Overall, this paper attempts to shed light on the predicament of reconciling the modern corporate 
governance framework with public limited companies in a traditional setting. Thus, we argue, 
Weber’s notions of traditionalism and rationality were very useful, especially in explaining why 
and how the family dynamic shapes the rational corporate measures imposed on listed companies 
in Bangladesh. With hindsight, the authors wish they had undertaken more in-depth investigations 
of how the power of families tends to be reproduced or reconstituted in everyday life. The authors 
also recognise that deeper investigations of the role of the military27 and bureaucracy in 
facilitating or obstructing the domination of family in Bangladeshi society would have provided 
further insights into the issues addressed in the paper. The failure to do so was mainly because of 
a shortage of time and the difficulty of obtaining relevant data.  
 
Nevertheless, our findings are directly in conflict with the World Bank’s expectations of 
implementing Anglo-American models in less developed and emerging markets, which is based 
on the belief that strong corporate governance institutions, such as capital markets and accounting 
infrastructure, will facilitate the creation of thick equity markets (World Bank, 2002; Mueller, 
2006). Donor agencies took pains to create an ‘enabling environment’ for limited companies in 
Bangladesh by financing capital market institutions and providing incentives for investors. Given 
the cost of this, it is surprising that the policy-makers pay so little attention to the structures of 
societal settings (World Bank, 1995; Uddin and Hopper, 2003). Consequently, LDCs, sponsored 
and advised by donor agencies, continue to focus on direct transfers of governance models from 
Anglo-American countries (Anisette, 2000; Uddin and Hopper, 2003). The obsession with 
Western governance models has led to insufficient regard for how traditional social structures, 
characterised by families, may affect Western solutions in Bangladesh. Thus, the paper encourages 
further research on corporate governance issues in traditional settings, which should take local 
peculiarities and culture into consideration. 
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Table One 
 
 
Break-up of Shareholding of 20 “A” Category Listed Local Companies Excluding Banks, 
Financial Institutions, Insurance and MNCs (Selected on the basis of paid up capital) 
 
Code Name Category
Paid up Capital 
(in mio taka) Sponsors* Govt Institutions Foreign
General 
Public
17420 BEXTEX A 1,712             64             -         13              -      23       
15307 DESCO A 1,271             75             -         -            -      25       
18453 BXPHARMA A 959               22             -         15              22       41       
15306 SUMMITPOWER A 715                64             -         -            -      36       
20620 EHL A 621                48             -         18              1          33       
18473 SQURPHARMA A 596               54             -         -            9         37       
13225 SALAMCRST A 533               50             -         9               -      41       
18470 BXSYNTH A 381                42             -         -            -      58       
17446 SQUARETEXT A 343               54             -         5               11        30       
20552 BDSERVICES A 338               -            100        -            -      -      
99613 BEXIMCO A 315                44             -         -            11        45       
13206 EASTERNCABLE A 240               -            51          -            -      49       
18477 KEYACOSMET A 240               69             -         27             -      4         
21622 MEGHNACEM A 225               58             -         16              -      26       
18472 ORIONINFU A 204               48             -         32             -      20       
22639 BDONLINE A 203               31              -         8               34       27       
99604 BSC A 200               -            88          -            -      12       
14286 FUWANGFOOD A 184                39             -         12              -      49       
99637 MIRACLEIND A 181                30             -         20             -      50       
13203 OLYMPIC A 173                34             -         19              -      47       
 
Source: Monthly Review, March 2007, Vol 22 No 03, DSE 
 
 
Notes: *sponsors are often close family members (members of the same family). 
                                                 
1 The recent events do not stand alone. Before the Enron and World Com debacle, there was the loan 
debacle and the junk bond saga in the United States (Marnet, 2007).  
2 Weber identified a number of structural conditions in a society, which in turn facilitate rational 
accounting/calculations, such as profitability etc. These conditions are: appropriations of all physical means 
of production, freedom of the market, free labour, rational technology, calculable law and 
commercialisation of economic law. 
3 Out of more than 2,500 public limited companies, only 253 companies, as of September 2006, are listed 
in stock exchanges. This includes MNCs, state-owned enterprises and banks. 
4 The Mujib family (1971-1975, 1996-2001), the Zia family (1975-1981, 1991-1996, 2001-2006) and the 
Ershad family (1981-1990). Currently, though, an interim government is in power. 
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5 They fall into the category of leaders whose assumptions of power are mediated by relatives as opposed to 
those whose careers are shaped from the beginning by their own choice, attributes and efforts (Jahan, 1987, 
p. 850). 
6 Protector/champion/head of the clan. 
7 This is based on the second author’s personal experience while working as an accountant during the 
course of the author’s working life prior to the commencement of the research project. The second author 
worked in various large companies that had been listed on the stock exchange for more than 15 years. 
8 This paper follows the tradition of Weber’s methodology of social science (see, Weber, 1964, pp 9-10). 
9 Banking, insurance and multinational companies are subject to further regulations. The paper excludes 
these companies. 
10 SEC rules include a number of acts and ordinances (see SEC website for details). 
11 There are two stock exchanges, namely the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock 
Exchange (CSE).  
12 Being advised and financed by the ADB, the SEC encouraged stock exchanges to reform the daily 
transaction system. The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) introduced an automated, on-line, screen-based 
trading system like their Western counterparts in 1998. In 2004, the Central Depository System (CDS) for 
electronic settlement of share trading made its debut in the DSE. These reforms were to achieve 
transparency and enable rapid transactions. 
13 SEC, being advised by the Ministry of Finance, had to waive the lock-in conditions for foreign investors 
as the IFC (International Financing Company) and ADB put the conditions on their investment in a local 
cement company. 
14 The SEC is a statutory body and is attached to the Ministry of Finance. Under the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Act 1993, the chairman and three members of the commission are appointed by the 
government. 
15 According to recent notification (comply or explain basis - non-mandatory) issued on 20 February 2006 
by the SEC, publicly listed companies (non-banking companies) should have at least 5 but no more than 20 
directors in the board. They also should have independent directors in the board. The number of 
independent directors should be at least one-tenth of the total directors subject to a minimum of one. 
Independent director/s should be elected by the elected directors. 
16 The taka exchange rate is approx. £ = Tk. 135. 
17 Institutional shareholding is fragmented. We have checked with the list of institutions referred to in the 
shareholding list of one of the top performing companies. This list includes any organizational buyers; 
5.81% of the shares are held by 88 institutions. 
18 The stock exchanges introduced categorization of shares into A, B, Z and G types depending on financial 
strength, performance, dividend payments, regularity in holding AGMs, etc. Category Z shares entail a 
longer settlement and clearing period compared to category A shares.  
19 These people appear to own a share or represent a shareholder. 
20 There is one common agenda item called ‘Miscellaneous’, under which a general shareholder can raise 
any issue with the permission of the chair at an AGM.  
21 The first author attended two AGMs. The second author attended numerous AGMs during his working 
life as an accountant. 
22 See SEC Notification No. SEC/CMMRRCD/2006-159/admin/02/09 dated 30 May 2006. 
23 Share price Tk. 22.75 (as at 28 October 2007). 
24 Uddin and Hopper (2001) reported one such example where the company had stopped submitting 
financial reports since 1994 to the SEC and is still stock exchange listed. Although there are laws against 
all of these practices, they have not been enforced with respect to this company as the owner was allegedly 
linked with the former prime minister’s family (the Daily Star, 14 March 2007). 
25 Covert and undue links between political leaders and business elites are not new in Bangladesh, but these 
links came under formal scrutiny soon after the new caretaker government took over power on 11 January 
2007 (The Financial Express, 2007).   
26 The anti-corruption commission, formed by the army-backed caretaker government, lodged a number of 
cases against the two former prime ministers representing two influential families. More importantly, the 
two former prime ministers and members of their families were recently sent to jail while cases against 
them are being processed in court.  
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27 The role of the army in Bangladeshi family politics is renewed as the current army-backed interim 
government takes a stand against family politics for the first time (Time, 22 March, 2007). 
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